10 U.S.C. § 6117: Annual assessments and reports to the President and Congress regarding the condition of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile

For each nuclear weapon type in the stockpile of the United States, each official specified in subsection (b) on an annual basis shall, to the extent such official is directly responsible for the safety, reliability, performance, or military effectiveness of that nuclear weapon type, complete an assessment of the safety, reliability, performance, or military effectiveness (as the case may be) of that nuclear weapon type. The head of each national security laboratory. The Commander of the United States Strategic Command. be comprised of weapons experts from the laboratory that does not have lead responsibility for fielding the warhead being evaluated; have access to all surveillance and underground test data for all stockpile systems for use in the independent evaluations; use all relevant available data to conduct independent calculations; and pursue independent experiments to support the independent evaluations. review both the matters covered by the assessments under subsection (a) performed by the head of that laboratory and any independent evaluations conducted by a dual validation team under subsection (c); subject such matters to challenge; and submit the results of such review and challenge, together with the findings and recommendations of such team with respect to such review and challenge, to the head of that laboratory. The results of each such assessment. an identification of the specific underground nuclear tests that are necessary to resolve such issues; and a discussion of why options other than an underground nuclear test are not available or would not resolve such issues. An identification of the specific underground nuclear tests which, while not necessary, might have value in resolving any such issues and a discussion of the anticipated value of conducting such tests. Such official’s determination as to the readiness of the United States to conduct the underground nuclear tests identified under subparagraphs (A)(i) and (B), if directed by the President to do so. a concise statement regarding the adequacy of the science-based tools and methods, including with respect to cyber assurance, being used to determine the matters covered by the assessments; a concise statement regarding the adequacy of the tools and methods employed by the manufacturing infrastructure required by section 6122 to identify and fix any inadequacy with respect to the matters covered by the assessments, and the confidence of the head in such tools and methods; a concise summary of the findings and recommendations of any teams under subsection (d) that relate to the assessments, together with a discussion of those findings and recommendations; a concise summary of the results of any independent evaluation conducted by a dual validation team under subsection (c); and a concise summary of any significant finding investigations initiated or active during the previous year for which the head of the national security laboratory has full or partial responsibility. a discussion of the relative merits of other nuclear weapon types (if any), or compensatory measures (if any) that could be taken, that could enable accomplishment of the missions of the nuclear weapon types to which the assessments relate, should such assessments identify any deficiency with respect to such nuclear weapon types; a summary of all major assembly releases in place as of the date of the report for the active and inactive nuclear weapon stockpiles; and the views of the Commander on the stockpile responsiveness program under section 6131, the activities conducted under such program, and any suggestions to improve such program. An identification and discussion of any matter having an adverse effect on the capability of the official submitting the report to accurately determine the matters covered by the assessments. each report, without change, submitted to either Secretary under subsection (e) during the preceding year; any comments that the Secretaries individually or jointly consider appropriate with respect to each such report; the conclusions that the Secretaries individually or jointly reach as to the safety, reliability, performance, and military effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States; and any other information that the Secretaries individually or jointly consider appropriate. Not later than March 15 of each year, the President shall forward to Congress the matters received by the President under paragraph (1) for that year, together with any comments the President considers appropriate. If the President does not forward to Congress the matters required under paragraph (2) by the date required by such paragraph, the officials specified in subsection (b) shall provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees not later than March 30 on the report such officials submitted to the Secretary concerned under subsection (e). Each submittal under subsection (f) shall be in classified form only, with the classification level required for each portion of such submittal marked appropriately. the Secretary of Energy, with respect to matters concerning the Department of Energy; and the Secretary of Defense, with respect to matters concerning the Department of Defense.